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The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into being on 1 July 2002.  A four-
person team opened an office in The Hague and will collect reports and allegations of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity until judges and a prosecutor are 
appointed towards the end of 2003.  Although the court was heralded by many states 
and international lawyers as the most important positive development in international 
law since the formation of the United Nations, it did not get off to an auspicious start.  
The Bush administration was concerned that US military forces operating overseas 
would be particularly vulnerable to what it described as ‘politicised’ prosecutions.  It 
therefore insisted that not only would it not be a part of the ICC, but also that it would 
not sanction the continuation of UN peacekeeping operations.  Closer to home, the 
Australian Senate only ratified the ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, after a 
bitter debate that split both the Liberal and National parties.  This was the case even 
though the Howard government—and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in 
particular—had been a leading advocate of the court and ratification of the Rome 
Statute had been a Liberal Party election promise in 2001.  The cost that Downer, and 
pro-ICC Attorney-General Daryl Williams had to pay in order to appease restive 
conservative backbenchers, the National Party, and an increasingly reluctant (and pro-
US) Prime Minister and secure the ratification was a declaration that reaffirmed the 
primacy of the Australian judicial system over the ICC.  The declaration insisted that 
no Australian would be prosecuted by the court without the consent of the Attorney-
General, and asserted Australia’s right to define what is meant by the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.     
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We argue that although Downer and Williams should be commended for their 
commitment to international justice, the declaration attached to Australia’s ratification 
was unnecessary and unhelpful.  The first and third aspects of the declaration were 
unnecessary: the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute means 
that the ICC already recognises the primacy of domestic jurisdiction, and the crimes 
covered are already considered to fall under universal jurisdiction, as the Nuremberg, 
Tokyo and more recent Pinochet trials showed (see Weller 1999).  The second is 
unhelpful because it contravenes both the letter and the spirit of the Rome Statute.  
We will begin, then, by tracing the development of the ICC debate in Australian 
politics.  In 1998, the government was an enthusiastic advocate of the court but by 
2002 an alliance of an ardently pro-US Prime Minister, vocal right-wing 
parliamentarians and their supporters, and The Australian (and its foreign affairs 
editor Greg Sheridan in particular) combined to put ratification in doubt.  Contrary to 
Prime Minister John Howard’s claims, this debate was not well informed.  Instead, it 
was characterised by hearsay, inaccuracy and scare mongering.  The subsequent 
section of the article demonstrates this by focusing on the background to, and creation 
of, the Rome Statute.   
 
Towards Australian Ratification 
Alexander Downer was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the ICC at the 
Rome conference in 1998. He pointed to the failure to learn the lessons of the 
Holocaust and prosecute the perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, 
arguing that at that time the international community ‘had neither the [political] will 
nor importantly the mechanism to carry out such a task’ (Downer 1998: 1).  The 
Foreign Minister identified four ‘fundamental issues’ that he wanted the final statute 
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to address in order to ‘take this text [the Statute] and turn it into a court room made of 
bricks and mortar that will give our children a weapon with which to fight the 
malevolent tendencies that have stained this century’ (Downer 1998: 2).  The first was 
the need to strike a balance between the jurisdiction of the court and domestic legal 
systems.  Downer maintained that the Australian government favoured a system 
whereby national jurisdiction took precedence over the jurisdiction of the ICC, in 
cases where the state concerned is ‘able and willing’ to deal effectively with the 
alleged crime (Downer 1998:2).  Second, the Foreign Minister pointed towards the 
need to agree appropriate mechanisms for triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction and an 
investigation by its prosecutor.  Australia’s preferred option, he argued, was for a 
prosecution to be triggered by either a complaint by a state party to the Statute or by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Third, Downer suggested 
that the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council needed to be resolved 
in a way that recognised the primacy of the Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  Finally, he demanded that there be agreement about 
the specific crimes that would be tried.  While he suggested that there was widespread 
international agreement about what ‘genocide’ was (encompassed in the 1948 
Genocide Convention) he pointed out that there was much less agreement about the 
specific definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ and that the Statute 
needed to offer such definitions if it was to become the weapon of international justice 
he envisaged.  Moreover, Downer stated that the Australian government wished to see 
the crimes of ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, and mass torture included in the 
court’s jurisdiction as well as crimes covered in existing international humanitarian 
legislation and the rules of war. 
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 Downer got everything he wanted at Rome, as we will show later.  He 
therefore moved for an early ratification to the treaty.  The Rome Statute would come 
into force once 60 of its 139 signatories had ratified it and Downer, Williams and 
Defence Minister John Moore—with the support of John Howard—argued at the end 
of 1999 that Australia should be amongst the first to ratify the treaty (Downer, 
Williams and Moore 1999).  That Downer himself was satisfied that the Statute met 
the four fundamental objectives he set down at Rome and that he believed that he was 
speaking for government policy as a whole was revealed in a speech he gave to a 
gathering of eminent lawyers from Australia, New Zealand, and the US in 2000.  
Here, Downer noted that Australia had aligned itself with the so-called ‘like-minded’ 
group of 67 states, including Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and the UK, that had 
lobbied for a powerful ICC with an independent and effective prosecutor.  Indeed, in 
1998 Australia took over the chair of that group from Canada (see Ball 1999: 199).  
Specifically addressing the American view that the Rome Statute constituted an 
unacceptable infringement on state sovereignty, the Foreign Minister observed that ‘in 
our view, this is incorrect’ (Downer 2000: 6).   
 On the possibility that Australian (or American) citizens could be prosecuted 
by the ICC, Downer argued that ‘it is possible that the court will hear a case against a 
person against the wishes of a state that is not a party to the Statute.  It is equally 
possible that the court will hear a case against the wishes of a state party to the 
Statute.  In neither case, however, is the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in conflict 
with the norms of [existing] international law’ (Downer 1998: 6). Those accused of 
crimes committed overseas are already subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which 
the crime was committed; the ICC does not present a new ‘foreign’ jurisdiction, but 
rather follows a well-established principle of international law. The definitional 
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problems that Downer identified at Rome had been satisfied, as had the Foreign 
Minister’s concerns about the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council.  
Finally, Downer paid considerable attention to conservative American (and 
Australian) fears that the ICC would be little more than a ‘kangaroo court’ pursuing 
politicised and trumped up charges against the US, a view put forward most 
vociferously by US Senator Jesse Helms (Graff 2002: 32).  According to Downer, ‘it 
is inconceivable that any politically motivated referral to the court from a state party 
without sufficient merit based on evidence would satisfy the scrutiny of the 
prosecutor.  Similarly, politically motivated referrals to the prosecutor from any other 
source would have to satisfy both the prosecutor and the pre-trial chamber of their 
independent merit before they could proceed further’ (Downer 2000: 7).  
 In 1998, the Australian government explicitly supported the ICC idea and 
located itself alongside states like Canada and the EU fifteen (except France) who 
argued that the new court should be a powerful and independent instrument of 
international justice.  Downer was not, he claimed, blinded by ‘dewy eyed idealism’ 
and went to Rome determined to resolve these four fundamental problems.  After 
Rome, government statements suggested that Downer had accomplished his goals and 
contributed to the creation of a Statute based on the primacy of domestic jurisdiction, 
clearly defined crimes, a proper relationship with the Security Council, and 
safeguards against politicised prosecutions.    There was no indication that the 
government had concerns with the Statute, that it would not be an early ratifier, or that 
it would add reservations to its eventual ratification.  The politicians and 
commentators in Australia who began to criticise the ICC in 2002 showed little 
appreciation that Downer had held similar concerns at the outset of the Rome 
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negotiations in 1998 but was evidently more than satisfied that those concerns had 
been met in the Statute.    
 Support for Downer’s position came from the substantive investigation of the 
potential impact of the ICC on Australia.  The Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties conducted an exhaustive enquiry on the Statute and its effect 
on Australian law.  Chaired by Liberal Party MP Julie Bishop, the committee 
interviewed a wide variety of witnesses including representatives from DFAT, the 
Attorney-General’s office, and the Defence Department, NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and the ‘Council for the National Interest’ and prominent individuals 
from both sides of the ICC divide.  The committee’s final report, published in May 
2002 (Joint Standing Committee 2002) concluded that Australia should ratify the 
Statute.  As a concession to right-wing concerns it argued that the relevant 
implementing act should include a declaration reaffirming the fact that ‘this Act does 
not affect the primacy of Australia’s right to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC’ (Joint Standing Committee 2002: para 
3.32).  As we will see later, the Rome Statute’s principle of complementarity 
enshrined the primacy of domestic jurisdiction, satisfying the committee’s concerns.  
Notably, the committee’s conclusion addressed each of the major complaints put 
forward by the domestic and international anti-ICC lobby: 
• Sovereignty: the committee found that ‘ratification of the ICC statute will not 
limit the rights of Australian citizens, or diminish the independence of 
Australia, or alter our internal system of government in any significant way’ 
(para 3.3). 
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• Defining the crimes: the committee concluded that ‘the crimes in the ICC 
Statute are not novel and…are defined with the same degree of detail as other 
domestic criminal offences’ (para 3.3). 
• The prosecutor: contrary to those who described the ICC prosecutor’s powers 
as ‘unchecked’, the committee found that it ‘will be subject to controls and 
will have to justify and seek approval for investigations and prosecutions 
(para 3.3). 
• The impact on the Australian Defence Forces and its peacekeeping 
commitments: the committee succinctly stated that ‘the ICC will not inhibit 
ADF peacekeeping or other operations’ (para 3.3). 
Thus, in recommending that the government take early action to ratify the Statute, the 
committee showed that it had considered the main anti-ICC arguments and had 
dismissed them, agreeing with Alexander Downer that Australia’s main concerns had 
indeed been addressed. 
 Although the parliamentary committee report had given the policy a 
resounding endorsement, Australia had held the chair of the ‘like-minded’ group of 
pro-ICC states, and the government had earlier professed its support for the Rome 
Statute as it was, the country witnessed an unedifying and uniformed debate about the 
ICC’s ratification, in which the Prime Minister backed away noticeably from one of 
his own government’s most well-established foreign policy objectives.  The 
Australian right’s vehement opposition to the court frequently descended into racist 
innuendo.  Queensland National Party MP, Paul Neville, denounced the ICC because, 
he claimed, it would place Australians at the mercy of ‘African and Asian judges’ (see 
Harvey 2002: 2).  Adopting a clearly nationalist critique, Andrew Bolt suggested that 
supporting the ICC meant handing over Australian sovereignty to ‘malicious and 
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powerful foreigners’ like George Soros (Bolt 2002: 19).  The arguments put forward 
by more ‘mainstream’ political actors such as the leader of the anti-ICC campaign in 
the Liberal Party, Bronwyn Bishop, former National Party Senator John Stone and 
foreign affairs columnist in The Australian, Greg Sheridan, while they avoided 
overtly racist arguments, nevertheless demonstrated little appreciation that Downer 
had expressed their concerns some four years earlier and was happy that those 
concerns had been resolved in the final Rome Statute.  Moreover, not one of them 
referred to the parliamentary committee’s findings or proceedings. 
 John Stone’s main concern, for example, was that the ICC represented a 
dramatic loss of Australian sovereignty.  Stone pointed out that the ICC could 
prosecute an Australian Special Forces soldier on ‘trumped up’ charges if it found that 
Australia had not made a genuine attempt to investigate or prosecute the crime.  That 
decision, he argued, resided with ‘two foreign judges’ (Stone 2002: 11).  This 
argument, which sits at the heart of the anti-ICC lobby’s claims, is flawed in a number 
of respects.  Firstly, the ICC can only prosecute perpetrators for one of three crimes: 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  The Rome Statute states that the 
commission of these crimes must be ‘widespread or systematic’ (see below).  It is 
difficult to see how a ‘trumped up’ charge of systematic genocide, mass murder or 
ethnic cleansing, can be made.  Moreover, such crimes will be criminal offences 
under Australian law and will therefore be investigated and prosecuted here. It is 
unthinkable that Australia would not investigate a charge of, say, the mass murder of 
civilians against one of its soldiers and prosecute the perpetrator if need be. Second, 
the ‘two foreign judges’ Stone refers to are actually eighteen judges who will hold a 
high level of legal qualifications and internationally recognised legal experience. 
These judges will be elected by - and be accountable to - the parties to the Statute.  
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Third, the pre-trial hearing that Stone alludes to will be comprised of independent 
(that is, non-ICC) judges.  The prosecutor will also be elected by a two-thirds majority 
of the parties to the Statute, and the parties will also have the right to impeach the 
prosecutor if they believe that he/she is not behaving appropriately.  Finally, the 
Security Council has the power to delay any prosecution indefinitely. 
 The Australian’s Greg Sheridan showed a similar lack of understanding of the 
ICC.  Sheridan’s argument was based on a view of the UN reminiscent to that held by 
Jesse Helms.  According to Sheridan, both the UN and EU are populated by meddling 
bureaucrats who would insist that the building of Jewish settlements in Palestine 
constitutes a punishable crime.  Sheridan is right in arguing that the Rome Statute 
identifies the repopulation of occupied territories as a war crime.  Such practices have 
long been proscribed by international humanitarian law; it should also be noted that 
since the Oslo Accords in 1992, the Security Council has consistently pronounced the 
illegality of Israel’s settlement program.  On the ICC itself, Sheridan argued that 
‘there is no serious argument for Australia to cede further sovereignty to a UN body 
that will be dominated by bureaucrats.  Human rights are protected by states.  
Democratic governments are accountable and have democratic legitimacy.  No one 
elected the UN’ (Sheridan 2002: 17).   
 This supposed loss of sovereignty was also the main theme of sceptical right-
wing parliamentarians who rallied behind former Liberal  minister, Bronwyn Bishop.  
Bishop claimed that the majority of Liberal backbenchers supported her and agreed 
with Sheridan and others that the ICC represented a dangerous ceding of sovereignty 
as the Statute contained no absolute guarantees that an Australian would not be 
prosecuted by the court (Cole 2002: 1).  One of Bishop’s parliamentary allies, 
National Party MP De-Anne Kelly, went as far as to suggest that the crime of 
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genocide could be turned against the Immigration Department by its political 
opponents for its treatment of asylum seekers. (Cole 2002: 1).  In fact, the wording of 
the Statute’s definition of genocide is exactly the same as the definition found in the 
Genocide Convention.  That Convention, signed by Australia in 1948, bound 
Australia to punish the perpetrators of genocide (see Ratner and Abrams 2001: 25-
45).  The Rome Statute does not, therefore, constitute a new commitment to the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide or a new definition of the crime.  It merely 
provides an additional mechanism for pursuing the perpetrators of this most heinous 
of crimes. 
 Bronwyn Bishop successfully rallied significant numbers of Liberal and 
National Party backbenchers to her cause, threatening the government with an 
embarrassing parliamentary revolt.  Somewhat more troubling for Downer and 
Williams was the effect of this conservative campaign on John Howard.  Shortly 
before the ICC ratification bill came before the Australian parliament, Howard visited 
US President George W. Bush. The President took the opportunity to warn Howard 
about the alleged perils of the ICC, an argument that the Australian Prime Minister 
later described as ‘powerful’ (Associated Press 2002a).  Bush’s argument, combined 
with the danger of a parliamentary revolt, persuaded Howard to adopt a much more 
cautious approach to the ICC, overturning three and a half years of consistent foreign 
policy.  On his return to Australia, Howard told parliament that ‘we’re not going to 
enter into any international obligations that compromise the sovereignty of this 
country’ (Anon 2002b: 9).  On the same day, he also refused publicly to commit 
himself to the Statute when prompted to do so by the Labour Party’s foreign affairs 
spokesman Kevin Rudd.   
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 Howard decided to place his own political position vis-à-vis his party ahead of 
Australia’s long-term foreign policy on the ICC by placing the matter of ratification in 
the hands of the coalition parliamentary group and the cabinet.  After two days of 
party room ‘debate’, conducted ‘amid anger, threats and recrimination’ (Anon 2002a: 
1) the Prime Minister referred the matter to the Cabinet.  Although reports suggest 
that a majority of both the speakers at the party room discussion and cabinet ministers 
spoke in favour of the ICC (Cole 2002b: 2), Howard remained unconvinced.  Within 
Cabinet, the anti-ICC case was put forward by Finance Minister Nick Minchin but 
outside, Alexander Downer’s case was bolstered by the vocal support of Australia’s 
two most senior military officers, Chris Barrie and Peter Cosgrove.  Both these 
commanders argued that the ICC would protect Australian defence forces from war 
crimes and warlords (Associated Press 2002a).  However, it was clear that Downer’s 
preference for an unqualified ratification would not be met and when the Federal 
opposition moved a motion to that effect, Howard mobilised the Coalition’s superior 
numbers to defeat it (Coorey 2002: 2).  
In the end, Downer could only placate the Prime Minister and secure 
ratification by developing a compromise solution.  The Foreign Minister proposed 
that the government should proceed with ratification but that it should insist on 
maintaining the primacy of its domestic jurisdiction and its ‘sovereign right’ to veto 
the prosecution of Australian citizens.  The declaration devised by Downer contained, 
as noted, three key aspects: First it stated that ‘Australia reaffirms the primacy of its 
criminal jurisdiction in relation to crimes within the jurisdiction of the court’ (Howard 
2002: 2).  Second, as a follow-on from the first, the declaration insisted that no 
Australian citizen would be surrendered to the ICC without the consent of the 
Attorney-General.  Finally, the declaration asserted that the crimes of genocide, war 
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crimes and crimes against humanity would be interpreted according to Australian 
domestic law.   
Thus, having been one of the leading advocates of the ICC, Australia only 
ratified the Rome Statute hours before the ICC came into being and attached a more 
extensive reservation to the treaty than any other ratifying state, except France.  As 
noted earlier, the first and third elements of the declaration were unnecessary whilst 
the second, we argue below, is either inadmissible because it breaches Article 120 of 
the Statute or alternatively may provide cause for other parties to the Statute to 
question the legality of Australian participation in ICC decision-making.  Such a 
claim could arise from customary international law regarding reservations contrary to 
the spirit of the treaty.  Before turning to these matters, however, the following 
section will demonstrate that the arguments put forward by the anti-ICC lobby were 
misplaced and misinformed because they replicated arguments previously aired and 
dealt with at Rome. 
 
The Rome Statute and the Prosecution of War Criminals 
The idea that there are some crimes so heinous that they fall under a universal 
jurisdiction and that individuals, including sovereigns, should be held criminally 
responsible for acts committed during wartime are not new.  Even before the Tokyo 
and Nuremberg trials after the Second World War, liberal states have tried to uphold 
these twin ideas along with the notion that the most appropriate way of dealing with 
war criminals should be ‘legalist’ rather than purely politically expedient.  That is, 
liberal states have consistently held the view that war criminals should be put on 
trial—and given a fair trial at that—rather than summarily executed.  Before Tokyo 
and Nuremberg, states attempted to deal with the vanquished Napoleon and the 
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defeated German Kaiser and his lieutenants through judicial proceedings (Bass 2000).  
Both attempts were, by and large, unsuccessful because the legal process could not be 
imposed on defeated states that were nevertheless unoccupied.  The post Second 
World War trials were much more successful (see Minear 1971 and Jackson 1971).  
In the wake of these trials, the UN established an International Legal Commission 
(ILC) with the task of creating a global war crimes court.  Along with many of the 
other of the UN’s early aspirations the idea of a universal court fell victim to the Cold 
War stalemate.  Nevertheless, states were able to agree in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, that genocide constituted a universally punishable crime.  Although no 
executive instruments were created to address that crime states have invoked this 
universal jurisdiction.  Israel claimed universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide 
when it forcibly extradited and tried Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann (Ratner and 
Abrams 2001: 30).  Nevertheless, such prosecutions were limited to the Nazi 
perpetrators of crimes in the Second World War.  No states claimed a universal right 
to put genocidal leaders like Idi Amin and Pol Pot on trial, creating a culture of 
impunity amongst states and non-state groups who commit crimes that shock the 
conscience of humanity.  Amin and Pol Pot were only brought to heel by 
interventions from neighbouring states—Tanzania and Vietnam—both of whom 
(Vietnam in particular) were condemned by international society for breaking the rule 
of non-intervention (see Wheeler 2000).    
 This culture of impunity fostered by international society’s failure to punish 
the perpetrators of crimes that shock the ‘conscience of mankind’ (Walzer 1977) 
became even more evident in the uncivil wars of the 1990s.  In former Yugoslavia, 
Serb and Bosnian Serb forces launched a series of attacks against Slovenia, Croatia 
and Bosnia and Hercegovina.  More than 200,000 people were killed in the Bosnian 
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war alone, the vast majority of them civilians, killed as part of a systematic campaign 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing (see Rieff 1995, Sells 1998).  The worst massacre 
came at Srebrenica, in 1995.  There, nearly 8,000 men and boys seeking refuge in a 
UN ‘safe area’ were slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces (Honig 1998).  In 1994, Hutu 
militias in Rwanda unleashed 100 days of genocide, killing over 800,000 Tutsis and 
Hutu moderates.  Once again, international society was in attendance.  However, 
rather than strengthen the UN force in Rwanda once the genocide began, the Security 
Council chose to withdraw it (Melvern 2000). Having failed to halt or ameliorate the 
bloodshed, the Security Council sought to punish the perpetrators by creating two ad 
hoc war crimes tribunals.  Both tribunals (ICTY for Yugoslavia and ICTR for 
Rwanda) got off to very slow starts, lacking both political will and funds.  For 
example, in 1994 the General Assembly gave the ICTY $5.4 million to cover its 
expenses, compared with the $94 million that the court received once it began 
investigating war crimes in Kosovo in 1999 (Bass 2000: 221, also Bellamy 2002). 
There were accusations of obstructionism by the Security Council, whose members 
seemed to place a higher value on realpolitik than on international justice (Goldstone 
2000).  Nevertheless, both tribunals have taken on momentum and have contributed to 
the development of international legal and political norms, not least through the arrest 
and trial of Slobodan Milosevic.  They both gave renewed focus to the twin ideas of 
universal jurisdiction and individual culpability (Greenwood 1993: 646-654).  An 
equally important development was the arrest of Augusto Pinochet and the two 
important legal decisions made by the British House of Lords: the first was that 
sovereigns did not enjoy immunity per se and the second was that there are crimes so 
serious that they fall under universal jurisdiction.  Thus, a state could extradite to 
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another country an individual suspected of committing such crimes in a third country 
(see Barker 2000 Hawthorn 1999, Weller 1999).   
 The ICC and the Rome negotiations therefore grew out of a developing trend 
that built upon well-established international legal principles.  However, what all the 
initiatives discussed above shared was their selectivity and the adjoining perception 
that the justice they meted out was nothing other than victor’s justice.  Although the 
statute of the ICTY covers all personnel deployed in former Yugoslavia after 1991 
(thus, all Australian personnel in the Balkans have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY since 1994), and the ICTY demonstrated its jurisdiction in 1999 by conducting 
preliminary investigations into the legality of NATO’s air strikes, it is geographically 
limited, as is the Rwanda tribunal.  There was therefore a widespread belief in the 
second half of the 1990s that the international community needed to develop a 
universal instrument to prosecute the perpetrators of the most heinous crimes. 
 Many of the states involved in trying to keep the peace argued that there was a 
need to end the culture of impunity and deter future offenders.  Supporters of the idea 
argued that only a powerful, independent and universal judicial instrument would 
accomplish this (Akhavan 2001).  The ILC created a Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) to begin work on a draft treaty based on a text that had originally been 
developed after the conclusion of the 1948 Genocide Convention.  Throughout 1996-7 
the PrepCom held a series of sessions looking at issues such as the core crimes that 
should fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the mechanisms for triggering an 
investigation and prosecution, and practical questions such as the appointment of 
judges and mechanisms for guaranteeing fair trials.  By the time a draft statute was 
presented to Kofi Annan in April 1998, it had grown from the 60 or so articles in the 
ILC’s original text to 116 articles.  The draft included 478 bracketed passages, which 
 16
the PrepCom indicated were areas where dispute remained (Ball 1999: 195-6).  Annan 
believed, however, that the draft provided a sound foundation for negotiations and 
convened an international summit in Rome to work on a final Statute. 
 One hundred and sixty one states sent representatives to Rome.  Not all states 
were committed to the idea, and some went to Rome to try to kill the very notion of 
an ICC.  A protracted conflict in the US between the pro-ICC State Department and 
the Pentagon, which had been resolutely opposed to the ICC since the idea was first 
mooted, was won by the Pentagon.  Throughout the conference the US thus refused to 
compromise even when confronted with an overwhelming majority against it, 
including virtually all of its closest allies.  As an indication of the US position in 
Rome it is worth noting that the head of a delegation of US Senators who visited the 
negotiations stated in Rome that ‘this court is truly a monster, and it is a monster that 
must be slain’ (cited in Ball 1999: 192).   
Broadly, the states involved in the negotiations divided into three groups.  
Firstly, there was the ‘like minded’ group, which was chaired by Australia and 
included over 60 states, such as Canada, the entire EU with the exception of France, 
New Zealand, Argentina, South Korea, Singapore, and South Africa.  As noted 
earlier, this group favoured a strong and independent court.  Second, there was the 
‘Security Council’ group, comprising all the permanent members of the Security 
Council except the UK.  This group argued that if there was to be an ICC, it should be 
controlled by the Security Council.  In the end, Russia and France were suitably 
satisfied with the Rome Statute to vote in favour of it and sign it whilst the US and 
China opposed it.  Finally, there were the ‘usual suspects’, states that opposed the 
very notion of an ICC and made uncomfortable bedfellows with the US.  These states 
included Iran, Iraq and Libya.  During the negotiations over 1,400 alternatives were 
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proposed and all the disputed aspects of the treaty on which consent could not be 
reached were voted on, on the basis of a two-thirds majority.  At the end of the 
summit there was a vote on the final statute.  One hundred and twenty states voted in 
favour (including Australia), only seven voted against (including the US, Israel, 
China, Iran, Iraq and Libya).   
 As the negotiations began it became clear that Alexander Downer’s concerns, 
which we discussed earlier, reflected broader international concerns that had to be 
resolved if agreement was to be reached.  There were broadly four major areas of 
dispute at Rome: (1) the definition of the crimes that would fall under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction; (2) the relationship between domestic jurisdiction and the ICC; (3) the 
mechanism for triggering a prosecution; (4) the relationship between the ICC and the 
Security Council. 
 Problem 1: Defining the Crimes.  We observed in the earlier section that one 
of the main criticisms of the ICC statute was the apparent lack of clarity about the 
crimes it is to prosecute.  The ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute people for committing 
any one of four types of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
crimes of aggression.  (It should be noted at the outset that the ICC has no authority 
over past crimes; its jurisdiction only covers crimes committed after 1 July 2002.) The 
delegates at Rome could not reach agreement on what constituted a ‘crime of 
aggression’, even though war crimes tribunals after both World Wars had prosecuted 
people for that very crime.  It was agreed, therefore, that no-one would be indicted for 
‘crimes of aggression’ until the international community had reached a consensus on 
what they are.  At the other end of the spectrum, there was no problem reaching a 
consensus on what constituted genocide.  Here, the Rome Statute adopted the precise 
wording of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which has been used to prosecute 
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individuals in both the ICTY and ICTR.  It is worth noting that the ICTY did not find 
anyone guilty of genocide until this year (the deputy commander of the Bosnian Serb 
forces at Srebrenica) and that in 1999 the International Court of Justice insisted that 
‘the threat or use of force against a state cannot in itself constitute genocide’ in 
response to a complaint against NATO by Yugoslavia.  In order to prosecute someone 
for genocide, the prosecutor not only needs to demonstrate the fact of mass killing or 
deportation but also needs to prove the intent to destroy an established and stable 
group ‘in whole or in part’, as the Convention and Statute both state.  ‘Trumped up’ 
prosecutions for genocide are therefore impossible. 
 While there is widespread agreement about what genocide is and the fact that 
it is illegal, there was much less agreement in Rome about the specificities of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  The bases for the definition of war crimes were 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two additional protocols that were agreed 
in 1977, all of which enjoy the status of customary international law. Syria resurrected 
an argument used by Burma in 1977 to insist that war crimes should only apply in 
inter-state wars and not internal conflicts.  Syria argued that restricting a state’s right 
to use force against secessionists or other guerrillas breached their sovereignty and 
would only encourage terrorists.  This motion contradicted the precedents set by the 
ICTY and ICTR, both of which established that these crimes were relevant to both 
international and internal conflicts, was opposed by Germany and Canada, and 
ultimately defeated by a more than two-thirds majority (Economides 2002: 116-119).  
With reference to war crimes, therefore, the statute referred to ‘grave breaches’ of the 
laws of war that drew their specific crimes from the Geneva Conventions and 
additional protocols, both of which were already part of customary international law. 
 19
 Perhaps the most controversial area of disagreement over definitions was the 
issue of crimes against humanity.  Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity are not 
gathered in already well-established treaties.  The Statute itself therefore had to offer 
an exhaustive and authoritative definition.  This is found in Article 7 and Appendix D 
of the Statute.  The Statute identifies crimes such as the traditionally recognised 
crimes of murder and rape and others that have emerged as a result of recent 
experience including rape and other forms of sexual enslavement, ‘forcible population 
transfer’ (ethnic cleansing), enforced disappearances (drawn from the Latin American 
experience), enforced sterilisation (opposed by China), and apartheid (Economides 
2002: 118, Robertson 1999: 335).   
The main dilemma that states confronted was the question of when a crime 
became significant enough in its scale to constitute a crime against humanity.  There 
was widespread agreement amongst states that credibility depended on the drawing of 
a high benchmark.  Thus, in order to breach Article 7 of the Statute the acts listed 
above have to be committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population’ (emphasis added, Article 7).  Many NGOs present at 
Rome were unhappy at the narrowness of this definition.  One of the most 
controversial aspects of the Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity is that it 
includes a passage insisted upon by the Arab League that defines the transfer by an 
occupying power of its own civilians into occupied territory as a crime against 
humanity.  Israel vehemently opposed this addition pointing out, quite correctly, that 
its settlement program in the Palestinian occupied territories would be proscribed.  
This prompted Israel to move from a position of cautious support for the Statute to 
one of outright hostility (Economides 2002: 118), although it should be observed that 
the addition was not entirely novel in terms of international law and—as mentioned 
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earlier—the Israeli settlement program had previously been deemed illegal by the 
Security Council. 
 Defining the specific crimes to be covered by the ICC was therefore a 
controversial issue, though perhaps not as contested as the anti-ICC lobby would have 
us believe.  Instead, the provisions of the Rome statute drew upon existing treaties, 
the core of which—such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and additional protocols—are regarded as customary international law.  
Perhaps the most controversial issue was the benchmark for ascertaining when the 
scale of the crime reached a level that would warrant ICC concern. On that issue, the 
Statute is very cautious, demanding that the commission of crimes be ‘systematic or 
widespread’, placing the onus on the prosecutor to prove that particular crimes are 
part of a wider set activities.  Thus, a one-off episode in which, for instance, a single 
Australian SAS soldier deliberately killed a handful of civilians would not fall under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC because there would be no question that such a crime was 
either systematic or widespread.  In the unlikely event that the soldier was retained by 
the SAS after the incident and went on to commit further crimes, that may fall under 
the ‘widespread’ criteria.  In that case, the issue of the relationship between the 
domestic judicial system and the ICC would come to the fore. 
 Problem 2: The relationship between domestic jurisdiction and the ICC.  One 
of the most frequent criticisms put forward by opponents of the ICC in Australia 
(especially Greg Sheridan) was that the ICC has less legitimacy than the Australian 
judicial system and should therefore not have the ability to overrule it.  There are two 
striking points to make at the outset.  First, no state proposed a system whereby the 
ICC’s jurisdiction would take precedence over domestic judicial systems that were 
willing and able to investigate and prosecute citizens for committing crimes of 
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genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity; the ICC is not intended to replace 
national courts. As part of the ratification process, parties to the Statute are also 
obliged to add the three core crimes to their own statute books.  Thus, crimes against 
humanity, as defined in the Rome statute, are now punishable under Australian law.  
Second, the relationship between domestic courts and the ICC is based upon the 
principle of complementarity.  That is, the ICC is meant to complement rather than 
supplant domestic courts.  The US argued that domestic jurisdiction should have 
primacy and there were no notable dissenters.  Thus, the state whose citizen is 
accused has primary responsibility for investigating the allegations and prosecuting 
the alleged perpetrator if it sees fit.  Only if it does not fulfil its responsibility would 
the matter fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.    
The debate focused on what criteria should be used to decide whether the 
domestic judicial system had fulfilled its obligations.  As with the definition of the 
crimes, the agreed benchmark errs on the side of caution and severely curtails the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.  Thus, the ICC ‘will act only when national courts are unable or 
unwilling to exercise jurisdiction’ (Article 12).  This is a major concession to 
sovereignty.  All a state has to do in order to prevent an ICC investigation is 
demonstrate that it has investigated the allegations itself.  Coupled with the insistence 
that the commission of crimes be ‘systematic or widespread’, it is clear that the ICC’s 
jurisdiction would not come into force in any but the most extreme cases.  Moreover, 
that jurisdiction would not be universal but would instead only apply if either the state 
where the crime was committed or the state whose citizen was accused was a party to 
the ICC. 
Problem 3: the mechanism for triggering a prosecution.  The court’s critics in 
Australia and the US argued that these high benchmarks would be irrelevant if the 
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prosecutor was able to launch investigations independently of the Security Council.  If 
the Security Council did not wield control, they argued, the prosecutor’s office would 
become an overly powerful and politicised body.  Such a body would in all likelihood 
try to force trumped up charges on the US because its service personnel played a 
unique role in maintaining international peace and security through its contribution to 
peacekeeping.  The United States’ unique peacekeeping role was frequently raised, 
the argument being that as the US had special responsibilities it should also have 
special protection against potential politicised prosecutions.  In fact, the US has less 
than 750 soldiers and civilian personnel in UN operations worldwide, a figure that 
places it well behind the leading contributors.  Moreover, the US contingent in the 
Bosnian mission that it threatened to bring to a premature end because of its ICC fears 
numbered a mere 45.   
The ‘like-minded’ group, supported by the hundreds of NGOs in and around 
the fringes of the Rome negotiations, argued that a strong, credible and universal 
court needed an independent prosecutor who was free to initiate investigations.  In 
contrast, the US, France and China argued that the prosecutor should only investigate 
cases referred to it by the Security Council.  The type of court they envisaged was an 
ICTY on a global scale.  The problem with this formulation was that it did not 
overcome the problem of selectivity and perception of ‘victor’s justice’ that 
accompanied it.  In effect, the Security Council group argued that whilst there should 
be an ICC, their citizens should be exempt from it simply because their states 
happened to have the power of veto on the Security Council.  Of the permanent 
members, only the UK was vocally opposed to this proposition.  The vast majority of 
other states also opposed this idea and used the voting procedure to block it.   
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Having conceded ground on the benchmarks for defining crimes and 
adjudicating on jurisdiction, the ‘like-minded’ group dug its heels in on the role of the 
prosecutor.  Thus, the statute allowed for three ‘trigger mechanisms’ for an 
investigation and prosecution.  First, the ICC could investigate an alleged crime at the 
behest of the Security Council.  Second, it could do so at the behest of a party to the 
Statute.  Third, the prosecutor’s office could initiate an investigation but only if it 
convinced a pre-trial chamber consisting of independent judges (ie. non ICC judges) 
of the impartiality and seriousness of the case (Economides 2002: 124).  The role of 
the prosecutor would be monitored by the parties to the Statute and the parties hold 
the right to impeach the prosecutor.  It goes without saying, of course, that the 
prosecution could only bring a case before a pre-trial chamber if the scale and 
seriousness of the crime fitted the ICC’s jurisdiction and if the primacy of domestic 
jurisdiction criteria had been met.  
Problem 4: the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council.  The 
final major debate concerned the relationship between the ICC and the Security 
Council.  As we noted above, most of the permanent members of the Security Council 
(except the UK) wanted the ICC prosecutor to be controlled by the Security Council.  
Following from the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, they argued that the only way 
to ensure that the court would be politically credible, impartial, and accountable 
would be to place it under the aegis of the Security Council.  The US, France and 
China argued that the Security Council should hold ultimate control over the ICC, 
deciding what to investigate, who to appoint as judges and which allegations to 
dismiss.  Such a proposal - by maintaining selectivity -  struck at the heart of the very 
ideas underpinning the ICC—universal jurisdiction and individual culpability.  
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A compromise solution was put forward by Singapore and accepted by the 
‘like-minded’ group and France, although the US and China continued to resist.  The 
Singapore compromise states that the Security Council can suspend an investigation 
for up to 12 months and can pass such a resolution an indefinite amount of times.  
Thus, in effect, the Council can suspend any investigation indefinitely.  The 
compromise appeased France because it gave the Security Council an important role, 
but also satisfied the ‘like-minded’ group because it placed the onus on the Council to 
block rather than initiate an investigation.  The rationale behind this was that the 
Council would be unlikely to block an investigation unless there were very good 
reasons for doing so (and a high level of consensus).  At the same time, however, the 
Singapore compromise also means that the Security Council can step in if there is 
evidence of politicisation or extreme political necessity.  It therefore marks a sensible 
solution that gives the Security Council an important role in the ICC whilst preserving 
as much judicial independence as possible. 
This brings us to the declaration that Australia tabled with its ratification of 
the Rome Statute.  We have argued that the first aspect of the declaration, the 
reaffirmation of the primacy of Australian domestic law was unnecessary because it is 
enshrined in the Rome Statute’s principle of complementarity. The third aspect, that 
Australia reserve the right to define what is meant by the crimes of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, was also unnecessary: the relevant crimes and 
the exhaustive definitions given are drawn from well-established customary 
international law, to which Australia already subscribes, and will in any case be 
incorporated into Australian domestic law.    
As we noted earlier, it is the second aspect of the declaration, the demand that 
no Australian citizen could be extradited to the ICC without the consent of the 
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Attorney-General that is potentially most troubling.  On the one hand, it is perhaps 
most likely that it will become a practical irrelevance.  By implication, a decision by 
the Attorney-General not to extradite a citizen would be based on a prior investigation 
of the allegations by Australia’s law enforcement agencies since the incorporation of 
the crimes into Australian law obliges those agencies to investigate complaints made 
against Australian citizens.  In this case, the ICC would have no jurisdiction because it 
could not be proved that Australia had been ‘unable or unwilling’ to investigate the 
allegations. There would therefore be no request for extradition.   
It is inconceivable that the Australian government would forbid its own law 
enforcement agencies from investigating crimes covered by the Rome Statute. To take 
a hypothetical case, let us say that an Australian SAS soldier is accused of a war 
crime by deliberately killing 20 civilians in Afghanistan.  Despite the allegations and 
the lodging of a formal complaint by a party to the Statute or the authorisation of an 
investigation by a pre-trial chamber of the ICC, the Australian government refuses to 
even investigate the allegations.  (Note, Australia has to be either unwilling or unable 
to investigate the allegations.)  Only then would the ICC’s jurisdiction kick in, and 
then only if the Security Council believed the veracity of the claim to be such that the 
investigation did not warrant blocking.  Only then would the prerogative demanded in 
the declaration come into effect.  Such a situation would only come about if the 
Australian government chose to disregard entirely its own domestic legal obligations, 
an unlikely development. 
 The danger with this second aspect of the government’s declaration is that it 
could be used to question Australia’s membership of the ICC and threaten the 
protection afforded to ADF personnel by the ICC.  In 1951, the ICJ passed a ruling 
that changed the function of reservations or declarations on treaties.  It found that if 
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the reservation contravened the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty at hand, other 
parties to the treaty have the right to consider themselves not party to the treaty vis-à-
vis the party that had tabled the reservation (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 40).  Let us 
take another hypothetical case: Australian peacekeepers are seized by enemy troops in 
East Timor who torture and execute them (East Timor has not yet signed or ratified 
the Statute but is expected to do so).  Because the second aspect of Australia’s 
declaration could plausibly be considered to breach the ‘object and purpose’ of the 
Rome Statute in that it could grant effective immunity to Australian citizens, East 
Timor could declare that it does not consider Australia to be a party to the Statute.  
This means that Australian forces operating in East Timor would not have the 
protection of the ICC and the Australian government would be unable to demand the 
prosecution of the perpetrators either by East Timor or the ICC.  It was just such a 
possibility that Barrie and Cosgrove were thinking about when they endorsed the ICC 
as an important contribution to the security of ADF personnel.        
 
Conclusion 
When it came to the Rome Statute, Australia proved to be a reluctant ratifier.  Having 
been at the forefront of the ‘like-minded’ movement lobbying for a powerful and 
independent court, Australia was not one of the first 60 states to ratify and added a 
series of reservations to its ratification to appease the right-wing in the coalition.  
While we commend Alexander Downer for his commitment to the ICC and his 
determination to secure ratification even when the Prime Minister wavered, one of the 
main features of political debate about the ICC in Australia was misinformation and 
misinterpretation.  We agree that ratification of international treaties requires 
discussion and input from the broader community, but in this case misinformed fears 
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of a loss of sovereignty and attempts to drum up the bogeyman of ‘foreign meddling’ 
very nearly meant that Australia would not participate in an important mechanism 
designed to prevent the very kinds of atrocities its government and citizens rightly 
condemn. The position of the anti-ICC lobby in Australia was baseless; critics ignored 
Downer’s negotiating position in Rome, failed to engage with his claim that his 
concerns had been met in the Statute, and completely ignored the findings of the 
parliamentary committee.  Combined with Howard’s increasingly pro-Bush 
persuasion, these arguments almost prevented Australia’s ratification and caused an 
embarrassing volte-face in foreign policy.  It remains to be seen whether this episode 
will prevent Australia from playing the pivotal role in setting up the court that 
Downer’s commitment to international justice warrants.  
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